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The type of malicious attack inflicting on networks greatly influences their stability under ordinary
percolation in which a node fails when it becomes disconnected from the giant component. Here
we study its generalization, k-core percolation, in which a node fails when it loses connection to a
threshold k number of neighbors. We study and compare analytically and by numerical simulations
of k-core percolation the stability of networks under random attacks (RA), localized attacks (LA)
and targeted attacks (TA), respectively. By mapping a network under LA or TA into an equivalent
network under RA, we find that in both single and interdependent networks, TA exerts the greatest
damage to the core structure of a network. We also find that for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks, LA
and RA exert equal damage to the core structure whereas for scale-free (SF) networks, LA exerts
much more damage than RA does to the core structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In complex networks science, malicious attacks may
crucially change the structure, stability and function of
a network [1–23]. The description of an attack on a net-
work is often represented by the ordinary percolation
model in which the giant connected component serves
as the relevant order parameter that shows the robust-
ness of a macroscopic cluster. The behavior of the giant
connected component is characteristic of the structural
transition of networks where nodes suffer either random
attacks (RA) [2–4, 24–28], localized attacks (LA) [29–31]
or targeted attacks (TA) [2, 3, 32, 33].
A natural generalization of ordinary percolation is the
k-core percolation in which the behavior of the k-core
characterizes the structural change of a network under
RA [34–36]. The k-core of a network is defined as the
largest subgraph in which each node has at least k neigh-
bors and is obtained through the pruning process in
which nodes of degree less than k are progressively re-
moved. If k = 1, then the k-core is simply the connected
component of the network and the giant k-core is the
giant connected component, exactly as in ordinary per-
colation. If k = 2, we again have a continuous transition
similar to ordinary percolation, as the 2-core is obtained
by simply pruning all dangling branches from the 1-core
[34, 37]. Under the k-core percolation with k ≥ 3, sin-
gle networks demonstrate discontinuous transitions at a
k-dependent critical threshold pc(k) [34–36]. Although
prior research has developed tools for probing network
resilience against RA in the context of k-core percola-
tion, and has found that degree distribution strongly in-
fluences network stability [34, 35], a systematic study of
how TA and LA affect network resilience in the case of
k-core percolation is still missing.
Here we extend the general formalism of the k-core
percolation for uncorrelated networks with arbitrary de-
gree distributions under RA [34, 35] to networks under
LA and TA, respectively. This allows us to obtain the
sizes and other structural characteristics of k-cores in a
variety of damaged random networks and to compare the
robustness of the networks under these three types of at-
tack scenarios in terms of k-core percolation.
We apply our derived general frameworks to study (i)
single ER networks [38, 39] with a Poisson distribution,
(ii) single SF networks [8–10] with a power-law distribu-
tion, (iii) two interdependent ER networks with the same
Poisson distribution in each network, and (iv) two inter-
dependent SF networks with the same power-law distri-
bution in each network. For each case, we investigate
how the type of attack influences the k-core percolation
properties. These include the size of the k-core, Mk(p),
as a function of p, the fraction of unremoved nodes and
the critical threshold pc(k) at which the k-core Mk(p)
first collapses. In all cases we find that our extensive
simulations and analytical calculations are in good agree-
ment. In general, TA exerts the biggest destruction on
the k-core structure of networks since the hubs of the
networks−nodes with higher degrees−are more likely to
be removed initially. We observe similar characteristics
of robustness in both single and interdependent ER net-
works under both LA and RA. However, for SF networks,
LA exerts considerably more damage than RA does to
the core structure.
II. RA, LA AND TA ON A SINGLE NETWORK
A. Theory
(I) Random Attack: Following Ref. [40], we introduce
the generating function of the degree distribution P (q)
of a random network A as
G0(x) =
∑
q
P (q)xq . (1)
2After an initial attack which is manifested by the ran-
dom removal of a fraction 1−p of nodes from the network
of size N , a cascading pruning process occurs as nodes
with degree less than k are progressively disconnected
from the network. We denote the stage right after the
random attack as stage t = 0 and the probability that
a given end of an edge is the root of an infinite (k-1)-
ary subtree as f0 [34]. After the first round of pruning
process which disconnects those nodes with active degree
less than k to the rest of network, we obtain a network in
which a fraction 1−p of nodes failed due to initial attack
and some other fraction of nodes have become isolated
due to k-core percolation. Now this network is at stage
t = 1 and at this time f0 decreases to f1. Note an end of
an edge is a root of an infinite (k-1)-ary subtree if at least
k − 1 of its children’s branches are also roots of infinite
(k-1)-ary subrees [34]. This leads to the equation for f1
in terms of f0, which is
f1 = p
∞∑
q=k−1
P (q + 1)(q + 1)
〈q〉
q∑
j=k−1
Cjqf
j
0 (1 − f0)q−j
≡ pΦ(f0), (2)
where Cjq = q!/(q − j)!j!, p is the probability that the
end of the edge is occupied, P (q + 1)(q + 1)/〈q〉 is the
probability that a randomly chosen edge leads to a node
with q out-going edges (other than the one first chosen)
and Cjqf
j
0 (1−f0)q−j is the probability that j out of these
q branches are roots of infinite (k-1)-ary subrees. Note
that j here must be at least equal to k − 1.
Similarly, after the pruning process finishes for the sec-
ond time, we would have f2 = pΦ(f1). More generally,
at each stage t we have ft obtained from ft−1 through
ft = pΦ(ft−1), (3)
and the probability that a random node in the damaged
network belongs to the k-core is [34]
[Mk(p)]t = p
∞∑
q=k
P (q)
q∑
j=k
Cjqft
j(1− ft)q−j
≡ pΨ(ft). (4)
Note that [Mk(p)]t is also the normalized size of the k-
core of the network at this stage. As t→∞, the network
will reach a steady state and we have ft → f , with f
satisfying the self-consistent equation
f = pΦ(f). (5)
Note an equivalent equation for f at the steady state was
also given in Eq. (2) of Ref. [34].
We note that for any given p, f can be solved from
Eq. (5) using Newton’s method with a proper initial
value. A trivial solution f = 0 exists if the occupa-
tion probability p is small and thereafter Mk(p) = 0,
i.e., no k-core exists in this case. As p increases and at
p = pRAc (k), a non-trivial solution f = fc 6= 0 first arises
and gives birth to a k-core. This is typical first-order
phase transition behavior for the network and it requires
the derivatives of both sides of Eq. (5) with respect to fc
be equal [34, 35], i.e.,
1 = pRAc (k)Φ
′
(fc). (6)
Therefore by using Eqs. (5) and (6), the threshold of k-
core percolation pRAc (k) is determined by
pRAc (k) = 1/Φ
′
(fc), fc = Φ(fc)/Φ
′
(fc). (7)
Here, fc is the value of f at the birth of a k-core. When
p > pRAc (k), there is always a non-zero solution of f that
ensures the existence of a k-core.
(II) Localized Attack: We next consider the localized
attack on network A by the removal of a fraction 1−p of
nodes, starting with a randomly-chosen seed node. Here
we remove the seed node and its nearest neighbors, next-
nearest neighbors, next-next-nearest neighbors, and con-
tinue until a fraction 1 − p of nodes have been removed
from the network. This pattern of attack reflects such
real-world localized scenarios as earthquakes or the re-
sults of weapons of mass destruction. As in Ref. [29], the
localized attack occurs in two stages, (i) nodes belonging
to the attacked area (the seed node and the layers sur-
rounding it) are removed but the links connecting them
to the remaining nodes of the network are left in place,
but then (ii) these links are also removed. Following the
method introduced in Refs. [29, 41], we find the generat-
ing function for the degree distribution of the remaining
network to be
Gp0(x) =
1
G0(l)
G0[l +
G
′
0(l)
G
′
0(1)
(x− 1)], (8)
where l ≡ G−10 (p).
Next we want to find an equivalent network A˜ such
that a random removal of a fraction 1− p of nodes from
it will produce a network with the same degree distribu-
tion as that obtained by a LA on network A described
above. We denote P (q
′
) as the degree distribution of net-
work A˜ and G˜A0(x) as its generating function. Following
the argument of equivalence discussed above and by set-
ting G˜A0(1 − p + px) = Gp0(x) [13, 31], and after some
rearrangement, we have G˜A0(x) as
G˜A0(x) =
1
G0(l)
G0[l +
G
′
0(l)
G
′
0(1)G0(l)
(x − 1)]. (9)
Therefore, P (q′) could be generated from G˜A0(x)
through direct differentiation [13]
P (q′) =
1
q′!
dq
′
dxq′
G˜A0(x). (10)
Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) we obtain the degree distri-
bution of the equivalent network A˜ as
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
, (11)
3with p˜ = G
′
0(l)/G
′
0(1)l.
Thus performing k-core percolation on the resultant
network after LA is equivalent to performing k-core per-
colation on network A˜ after a random removal of the
same fraction of nodes. This enables us to transform a
LA problem into the familiar RA problem examined in
the previous scenario. Then for the LA scenario we re-
place P (q) in Eqs. (4) and (5) with P (q′) obtained from
Eq. (11) and obtain the size of k-core Mk(p) as well as
its critical threshold pLAc (k).
(III) Targeted Attack: Next, we consider the targeted
attack on network A by the removal of a fraction 1−p of
nodes where nodes are removed based on their degree [32,
33]. This pattern of attack reflects such real-world cases
as intentional attacks on important transportation hubs
or sabotage on the Internet [42]. To analyze this case, a
value Wα(qi) is assigned to each node, which represents
the probability that a node i with qi links is initially
attacked and becomes dysfunctional. This probability is
described through the family of functions [43]
Wα(qi) =
qαi∑N
i=1 q
α
i
,−∞ < α < +∞. (12)
When α > 0, nodes with higher connectivity have a
higher probability to be removed while α < 0 indicates
otherwise. Note that for α = 0, all nodes have equal
probability to be removed, which is exactly the same as
the RA case.
As described in Ref. [32], the targeted attack occurs
in two stages, (i) nodes are chosen according to Eq. (12)
and later removed but the links connecting the removed
nodes and the remaining nodes are left in place, but then
(ii) these links are also removed.
Following the method introduced in Refs. [32, 41], we
find the generating function for the degree distribution of
the remaining network to be (only removing the nodes)
Gb(x) =
1
p
∑
q
P (q)lq
α
xq, (13)
where l = G−1α (p) and Gα(x) ≡
∑
∞
q=0 P (q)x
qα . The frac-
tion of the original links that connect to the remaining
nodes is p˜ =
∑
q P (q)ql
qα/
∑
q P (q)q. Further removing
the links which end at the removed nodes of a randomly
connected network is equivalent to randomly removing a
fraction 1− p˜ of links of the remaining nodes. Using the
approach introduced in Ref. [13], we find that the gener-
ating function of the remaining nodes after the removal
of the links between removed nodes and remaining nodes
is
Gc(x) = Gb(1− p˜+ p˜x). (14)
Next we find an equivalent network B˜ in which a random
removal of a fraction 1−p of nodes will produce a network
with the same degree distribution as that obtained by a
TA on network A described above. We denote P (q
′
) as
the degree distribution of network B˜ and G˜B0(x) as its
generating function. Following the equivalence argument
discussed above and setting G˜B0(1 − p + px) = Gc(x)
[13], after some algebra, we obtain G˜B0(x) as G˜B0(x) =
Gc(1 +
1
p (x− 1)). Using Eq. (14), we thus have
G˜B0(x) = Gb(
p˜
p
(x− 1) + 1). (15)
Accordingly, combining Eqs. (13) and (15) and using
direct differentiation we obtain the degree distribution
P (q′) of the equivalent network B˜ as
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
α
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
. (16)
Thus performing k-core percolation on network A after
a TA is the same as performing the k-core percolation on
network B˜ after a random removal of the same fraction
of nodes. By replacing P (q) in Eqs. (4) and (5) with
P (q′) obtained from Eq. (16), for the TA scenario we can
obtain the size of k-core Mk(p) together with its critical
threshold pTAc (k).
B. Results
To test the analytical solutions derived in Section A,
we conduct numerical solutions of the analytic expres-
sions, and compare the results with simulation results
on single networks with degrees following both Poisson
distributions and power-law distributions under RA, LA
and TA. All the simulation results are obtained for net-
works with N = 106 nodes.
1. Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
We first consider ER networks of which the degree dis-
tribution is Poissonian, i.e., P (q) = e−λ λ
q
q! with the av-
erage degree denoted by λ.
In the RA scenario on an ER network with k = 4
and λ = 10, we exhibit in Fig. 1(a) several realizations
the cascading pruning process under k-core percolation
with p slightly smaller than pRAc (k), in comparison with
theory. Note that the simulation results for the cas-
cading pruning agree well with analytical results from
Eqs. (3) and (4). Different realizations give different
results due to random fluctuations of the dynamic pro-
cesses showing deviations from the mean field, rendering
small fluctuations around the mean-field analytical re-
sult. To calculate the first-order phase transition point
pRAc (k) with good precision, as shown in Fig. 1(b), we
identify the characteristic behavior of the number of it-
erations (NOI) in the cascading process [44]. This gives
us pRAc (k) = 0.515, corresponding to the peak of the NOI.
Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show the variation of the pruning
size st, which is the number of nodes that are pruned at
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Dynamics of an ER network near crit-
icality under random attack applying k-core percolation. (a)
Dynamical process of the k-core size [Mk(p)]t of the ER net-
work with k = 4, λ = 10 and N = 106 both in theory
(red line with circles) and in simulation (solid black lines)
at p = 0.5145, slightly below pRAc (k) = 0.515. (b) Number
of iterations (NOI) before network reaching stability. This
number peaks at p = pRAc and it drops quickly as p moves
away from pRAc (k) [44, 45]. (c) At p = 0.5145, the red line
with circles represents the variation of failure sizes st (only
the plateau stage) for one realization in the simulation; the
black dashed line shows st for the theoretical case. (d) At
p = 0.5145, the red line with rectangles shows the variation
of the average branching factor ηt for one realization in the
simulation; the black dashed line shows ηt of the analytic
solution. Note that this figure is similar to that found in
interdependent networks [45].
stage t, and the branching factor ηt (ηt = st+1/st), re-
spectively, in one typical realization that finally reached
total collapse. Note that st initially drops as the network
is still well connected and thus less nodes are pruned per
pruning step (st > st+1). Then the network becomes
weak enough and st remains at low and almost constant
value during the plateau stage while the network keeps
getting weaker. Finally st rises as a failure in the current
step leads to more than one failure in the next step and
results in the total collapse of the network (see Fig. 1(c)).
Although st first decreases, the ratio of two consecutive
pruning sizes, ηt, increases. Specifically ηt increases dur-
ing the initial cascades from below 1 to approximately
1 (with some fluctuations) at the plateau, which starts
at time T when each of the sT pruned nodes leads, on
average, to failure of another single node. This is a sta-
ble state, leading to the divergence of t for N → ∞,
where the cascading trees become critical branching pro-
cesses [45, 46] with the average time at criticality scales
as N1/3 [45]. In a finite network of size N , however, the
accumulated failures weaken the network step by step
and thus st starts to rise, leading to the collapse of the
system. During this period, ηt rises to above 1 as shown
in Fig. 1(d).
When the dynamics end, the network enters the steady
state. At this state, Fig. 2 shows the k-core Mk(p) as a
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Sizes of the k-core,Mk(p), as a function
of the fraction of unremoved nodes, p, for a single ER network
with λ = 10 and k = 4. Here solid lines are theoretical
predictions, from Eq. (4) for RA and its counterparts of LA
and TA (with α = 1), and symbols are simulation results with
network size N = 106, under RA (©), LA () and TA (△).
Note that for ordinary percolation under either RA or LA,
the system is significantly more resilient, and the transition
is continuous at pc = 1/λ = 0.1.
function of the occupation probability p under RA, LA
and TA (with α = 1) in the context of k-core percola-
tion. Note that the simulation results agree well with
the theoretical results and that there is first-order per-
colation transition behavior in all attack scenarios. Note
also that pRAc (k) is equal to p
LA
c (k) and they both are
smaller than pTAc (k). This is similar to ordinary perco-
lation [29, 32]. This is the case because for ER networks
with P (q) = e−λ λ
q
q! , from Eq. (11) the degree distribu-
tion P (q′) of the equivalent network A˜ can be calculated
to be
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
=
e−λ[λl p˜p ]
q′
pq′!
∞∑
q=q′
[λl(1− p˜p )]q−q
′
(q − q′)!
=
e−λ[λl p˜p ]
q′
pq′!
eλl(1−
p˜
p
)
= e−λ
λq
′
q′!
, (17)
where we use l = ln(p)λ + 1 and p˜ = p/l for simplifica-
tion. Note that from Eq. (17) the degree distribution
of network A˜ is also Poissonian and has the same av-
erage degree λ as the original network. Thus, we have
pRAc (k) = p
LA
c (k) as observed. Similarly from Eq. (16)
with α = 1, we find the degree distribution P (q′) of the
equivalent network B˜ to be
P (q′) = e−λl
2 (λl2)q
′
q′!
, (18)
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Graphical solution of Eq. (5) for the k-
core percolation with k = 4 in an ER network under RA with
an average degree of 10. The straight line and the curves
pΦ(f) show, respectively, the left- and right-hand side of
Eq. (5) as functions of f for different values of p. The nonzero
solution of f appears above the critical value pRAc (k) = 0.515,
at which the right-hand side curve pΦ(f) starts to intersect
the straight line. The physical solution is provided by the
largest root of the equation f = pΦ(f) when p > pRAc (k) (the
upper intersection in the plot).
with l = ln(p)λ + 1. Note that from Eq. (18) the degree
distribution of network B˜ is also Poissonian but has a
smaller average degree λl2 as l is always smaller than
1 [32]. Compared to that under RA, the removal of the
same fraction of nodes under TA reduces a larger amount
of connectivity in the network and therefore, in the con-
text of k-core percolation, the critical threshold pTAc (k)
is significantly larger than pRAc (k).
As an example, Fig. 3 shows the solution of Eq. (5)
for different values of the occupation probability p under
RA and demonstrates the origin of the first-order transi-
tion. When p < pRAc (k), the straight line and the curve
only have an intersection at f = 0, which always renders
Mk(p) = 0 according to Eq. (4). A k-core Mk(p) first
arises discontinuously at p = pRAc (k), when the straight
line and the curve tangentially touch each other at a
nonzero intersection at f = fc, satisfying Eq. (6). As
p increases further and becomes greater than pRAc (k),
Mk(p) continues to exist as an additional intersection
appears, and this serves as the physical solution of f (see
the upper intersection in Fig. 3). Similar procedures are
applied to the LA and TA scenarios as well and the corre-
sponding pLAc (k) and p
TA
c (k) are obtained, respectively.
Next we obtain the relationship between the robustness
of the network under the three types of attacks and the
threshold k in the context of k-core percolation. Figure 4
shows how the percolation thresholds pc(k) under RA,
LA and TA, change with k where λ = 10 for a single
ER network. Here in Fig. 4, as k increases from 3 to
7, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k) and p
TA
c (k) increase accordingly. For
each k value, pRAc (k) = p
LA
c (k) < p
TA
c (k, α = 1.0) <
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc(k) of a single
ER network as a function of k under RA, LA and TA with
α = 1, λ = 10. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions and
symbols (© for RA,  for LA, △ for TA with α = 1.0 and ▽
are for TA with α = 2.0) are simulation results with network
size of N = 106 nodes. Note that LA coincides with RA.
pTAc (k, α = 2.0), which indicates that in the context of
k-core percolation RA and LA cause the same amount of
damage to the structure of an ER network, but that TA
causes more severe structural damage to an ER network.
Moreover, we find that RA and LA have very similar
dynamic properties in terms of NOI as well as the pruning
size st. Figure 4 also indicates that with a larger α, TA
will cause more damage since higher degree nodes are
more likely to be removed. Similar results are reported
in the context of ordinary percolation on ER networks
[29, 32].
2. Single scale-free networks
We next consider SF networks in which degrees of
nodes follow a power law distribution, i.e., P (q) ∝ q−γ
with the degree exponent γ ∈ (2, 3]. As in Ref. [34], a
size dependent cutoff qcut(N) of the degree distribution is
introduced. For the configuration model without multi-
ple connections the dependence qcut(N) ∼
√
N is usually
used when 2 < γ ≤ 3, and first-order percolation transi-
tion behavior was observed in the RA case [34]. Figure 5
shows Mk(p) as a function of the occupation probabil-
ity p under RA, LA and TA (with α = 1) under k-core
percolation with k = 4 and γ = 2.3. The simulation
results agree well with the theoretical results, and there
is first-order percolation transition behavior in all attack
scenarios. Note that pLAc (k) is approximately equal to
pTAc (k), and that they both are significantly larger than
pRAc (k). Because SF networks are ultrasmall [10, 47],
the LA process can easily spread from the seed node to
high degree hubs in several steps and therefore severely
disrupts the core structure of the network, an outcome
similar to that of the TA process. This is in marked con-
trast to the case of ER networks in which the majority of
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Sizes of the k-core,Mk(p), as a function
of the fraction of unremoved nodes, p, for a single SF network
with γ = 2.3, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 and k = 4. Here solid
lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (4) for RA and its
counterparts of LA and TA (with α = 1), and symbols are
simulation results with network size N = 106, under RA (©),
LA () and TA (△).
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc(k) of a single
SF network as a function of k under RA, LA and TA with
α = 1, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 for γ = 2.3 (solid red lines)
and γ = 2.6 (dashed purple lines). Here lines are theoretical
predictions and symbols (© for RA,  for LA and △ are
for TA) are simulation results with network size of N = 106
nodes.
nodes have degrees around the average degree and there-
fore for the RA and LA processes, nodes of high degrees
are less likely to be reached than those in the TA process.
Next we determine the relationship between the ro-
bustness of the network under three types of attacks
and the threshold k in the context of k-core percola-
tion. For a single SF network, Fig. 6 shows how the per-
colation thresholds pc(k) under RA, LA and TA (with
α = 1) change with k for two values of γ. As seen in
Fig. 6, the pc(k) values under all attack scenarios for
γ = 2.3 are smaller than those for γ = 2.6, which indi-
cates that SF networks with smaller γ values are more
stable in the context of k-core percolation. In addition,
for each value of γ as k increases from 3 to 7, pRAc (k),
pLAc (k) and p
TA
c (k) increase accordingly. For each k
value, pLAc (k) ≈ pTAc (k) > pRAc (k), which indicates that
in the context of k-core percolation, LA and TA (with
α = 1) exert approximately the same amount of damage
to the structure of a SF network whereas RA produces
less severe structural damage to a SF network. Analogous
results are reported in the context of ordinary percolation
on SF networks [29, 32].
III. RA, LA AND TA ON INTERDEPENDENT
NETWORKS
A. Theory
We extend the formalism of ordinary percolation on
fully interdependent networks introduced in Ref. [24] to
k-core percolation. Specifically, we consider two networks
A and B with the same number of nodes N . Within each
network the nodes are randomly connected with the same
degree distribution P (q). A fraction dA of nodes from
network A depend on nodes in network B, and a fraction
dB of nodes from network B depend on nodes in network
A. We also assume that if a node i in network A depends
on a node j in network B and node j depends on node
l in network A, then l = i, which rules out the feedback
condition [48]. This interdependence means that if node
i in network A fails, its dependent node j in network B
will also fail, and vice versa.
(I) Random Attack : We begin by randomly removing
a fraction 1 − p of nodes in network A. All the nodes in
network B that are dependent on the removed nodes in
network A are also removed. Then a cascading pruning
process begins, and nodes with degree less than k1 in net-
work A and k2 in network B are sequentially removed in
the k-core percolation process. Due to interdependence,
the removal process iterates back and forth between the
two networks until they fragment completely or produce
a mutually connected k-core with no further disintegra-
tion, where k ≡ (k1, k2) [24, 36].
When the system of interdependent networks stops dis-
integrating, as in a single network we let fA(fB) be the
probability that a given end of an edge of network A(B)
is the root of an infinite (k1(2)-1)-ary subtree. An end
of an edge is a root of an infinite (k1-1)-ary subtree of
network A if it is an autonomous node [49] and at least
k1 − 1 of its children’s branches are also roots of infinite
(k1-1)-ary subrees; otherwise, despite that, the node it
depends on has to be in the k2-core of network B. Sim-
ilar arguments exist for edges in network B. These lead
to the equation of fA in terms of fA and fB as
fA = pΦA(fA)(1− dA) + pΦA(fA)ΨB(fB)dA
= pΦA(fA) [(1− dA) + dAΨB(fB)] , (19)
where p is the probability that an end n0 of an edge is
occupied, ΦA(fA) is the probability that n0 is a root of
an infinite (k1-1)-ary subtree, 1 − dA is the probability
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Sizes of k-core of network A, MAk (p),
as a function of the fraction of unremoved nodes, p, for two
partially interdependent ER networks with d = 0.5, λ = 10
and k = (3, 4). Here solid red lines are theoretical predictions,
from Eq. (21) for RA and its counterparts of LA and TA for
α = 1, and symbols are simulation results with network size
N = 106, under RA (©), LA () and TA (△).
that n0 is an autonomous node, dA is the probability that
n0 depends on a node n
′ in network B, and ΨB(fB) is
the probability that n′ is in the k2-core of network B.
Following similar arguments, we obtain the equation of
fB in terms of fA and fB,
fB = ΦB(fB) [(1− dB) + dBpΨA(fA)] . (20)
Note that for any given value of p, fA and fB can be
solved from Eqs. (19) and (20) using Newton’s method af-
ter choosing appropriate initial values. We denoteMA
k
(p)
and MB
k
(p) as the probability that a randomly chosen
node in network A and B belongs to the mutually con-
nected k-core, respectively, and they satisfy{
MA
k
(p) = pΨA(fA) [1− dA + dAΨB(fB)] ,
MB
k
(p) = ΨB(fB) [1− dB + dBpΨA(fA)] .
(21)
Note that the mutually connected k-core is made up of
the k1-core in network A (with its normalized size de-
noted by MA
k
(p)) and the k2-core in network B (with its
normalized size denoted by MB
k
(p)).
The trivial solution fA = fB = 0 for low occupa-
tion probability p signifies the absence of a k-core in the
system. As p increases, a nontrivial solution emerges
in the critical case (p = pRAc (k)) in which two curves
fA = fA(fB) and fB = fB(fA) tangentially touch each
other, i.e.,
dfA
dfB
· dfB
dfA
= 1 (22)
which, together with Eqs. (19) and (20), gives the so-
lution for pRAc (k) and the critical size of the mutually
connected k-core. When p > pRAc (k), these two curves
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Graphical solution of Eqs. (19) and
Eq. (20) for the k-core percolation with k = (3, 4) and d =
0.5 in two interdependent ER networks A and B with the
average degree 10, where network A is damaged initially under
RA. The blue and red curves show, respectively, Eq. (19)
and Eq. (20) for the value of p = pRAc (k). The nontrivial
solution of fA and fB appears at the critical value p
RA
c (k) =
0.391, at which the two curves intersect tangentially with each
other, satisfying Eq. (22). When p > pRAc (k), these two curves
will always have a nonzero intersection and it serves as the
physical solution.
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc(k) of two
interdependent ER networks as a function of interdependence
strength d under RA, LA and TA with λ = 10 and k = (3, 4).
Here solid lines are theoretical predictions and symbols (©
for RA,  for LA and △ are for TA) are simulation results
with network size of N = 106 nodes. Note that for d = 0
the results reduce to the case of single networks with k = 3,
shown in Fig. 4.
will always have a nonzero intersection that constitutes
a physical solution. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we use dA = dB ≡ d throughout the rest of
this paper.
(II) Localized Attack : When LA is performed on the
system of interdependent networks A and B described
above, we find an equivalent random network E with a
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Sizes of the k-core of network A,
MAk (p), as a function of the fraction of unremoved nodes, p,
for two partially interdependent SF networks with d = 0.5,
γ = 2.3, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 and k = (3, 4). Here
solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (21) for RA
and its counterparts of LA and TA for α = 1, and symbols
are simulation results with network size N = 106, under RA
(©), LA () and TA (△).
degree distribution P (q′) [from Eq. (11)] such that af-
ter a random attack in which a fraction 1− p of nodes in
network E are removed, the degree distribution of the re-
maining network is the same as the degree distribution of
the remaining network resulting from an LA on network
A. Then by mapping the LA problem on interdependent
networks A and B to a RA problem on a transformed
pair of interdependent networks E and B, we can ap-
ply the mechanism of RA on interdependent networks to
solve pLAc (k) and the mutually connected k-core under
LA.
(III) Targeted Attack : Analogously, when TA is per-
formed on the interdependent networks A and B de-
scribed above, we find an equivalent random network F
with a degree distribution P (q′) [from Eq. (16)] such that
after a random attack in which a fraction 1−p of nodes in
network F are removed, the degree distribution of the re-
maining network is the same as the degree distribution of
the remaining network resulting from an TA on network
A. Thus, by mapping the TA problem on interdependent
networksA and B to a RA problem on a transformed pair
of interdependent networks F and B, we can apply the
mechanism of RA on interdependent networks to solve
pTAc (k) and the mutually connected k-core under TA in
the case of k-core percolation.
B. Results
1. Two interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
We start with two partially interdependent networks in
which the degrees both follow the same Poisson distribu-
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FIG. 11. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc(k) of two
interdependent SF networks as a function of interdependence
strength d under RA, LA and TA with α = 1, qmin = 2,
qcut(N) = 1000, γ = 2.3 and k = (3, 4). Here solid lines
are theoretical predictions and symbols (© for RA,  for LA
and △ are for TA) are simulation results with network size of
N = 106 nodes. Note that for d=0 the results reduce to the
case of single networks with k=3, seen in Fig. 6.
tion and exert a RA on networkA, initiating a k-core per-
colation pruning process that continues until equilibrium
is reached. We then follow the same procedure with the
same set-up but this time using a LA and TA to initiate
the pruning process. Figure 7 shows the k-core MA
k
(p)
of network A as a function of the occupation probability
p under RA, LA and TA (with α = 1) in the context of
k-core percolation with d = 0.5, k = (3, 4) and λ = 10.
The simulation results agree well with the theoretical re-
sults, and there are first-order percolation transitions in
all attack scenarios. As in single ER networks, note that
pRAc (k) is equal to p
LA
c (k) and both are smaller than
pTAc (k).
Figure 8 shows for instance the critical solution of
Eqs. (19) and (20) for the case of RA shown in Fig. 7.
When p < pRAc (k), the two curves representing Eqs. (19)
and (20) correspondingly intersect only at the origin, and
this always renders a zero-sized k-core MA
k
(p) according
to Eq. (21). A k-core MA
k
(p) first arises discontinuously
at p = pRAc (k), when these two curves tangentially touch
each other at a nonzero intersection at (fAc, fBc), sat-
isfying Eq. (22). As p increases further above pRAc (k),
MA
k
(p) continues to exist because of the presence of a
nonzero intersection that serves as the nontrivial solution
of Eqs. (19) and (20). Similar procedures are applied to
the LA and TA scenarios as well and the corresponding
pLAc (k) and p
TA
c (k) are obtained, respectively.
Next we obtain the relationship between the robustness
of the network system, i.e., the threshold pc(k), under
three types of attacks and the interdependence strength
d in the context of k-core percolation. Figure 9 shows
how the percolation thresholds pc(k) under RA, LA and
TA (with α = 1), change with d where k = (3, 4) and
λ = 10 for two ER networks. As seen in Fig. 9, when
9d increases from 0 to 1, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k) and p
TA
c (k) in-
crease accordingly, which means that the higher the level
of interdependence between networks A and B, the less
resilient they are against attacks. Note that d = 0 corre-
sponds to the case in which there is no interdependence
between networks A and B and the thresholds pc(k) re-
duce to those shown in Fig. 4 at k = 3. For each d
value, pRAc (k) = p
LA
c (k) < p
TA
c (k), which indicates that
in the context of k-core percolation, RA and LA exert
the same level of damage to the structure of an ER net-
work, but that TA produces more severe damage to an
ER network. Similar results are reported in the context
of ordinary percolation on interdependent ER networks
[31, 32].
2. Two interdependent scale-free networks
We construct two interdependent networks in which
the degrees in each follow the same power law distribu-
tion. Figure 10 shows the k-core MA
k
(p) of network A
as a function of the occupation probability p under RA,
LA and TA (with α = 1) under k-core percolation with
k = (3, 4) and γ = 2.3. The simulation results agree well
with the theoretical results, and there is first-order per-
colation transition behavior in all attack scenarios. Note
that pLAc (k) is approximately equal to p
TA
c (k) and they
both are significantly larger than pRAc (k). As in single
SF networks, the LA process can easily spread from the
seed node to high degree hubs in few steps and therefore
greatly disintegrates the core structure of the network,
similar to the TA process. This is in strong contrast to
the case of ER networks in which most nodes have de-
grees close to the average degree and therefore for the RA
and LA processes, nodes of high degrees are less likely to
be removed compared to the TA process.
Next we compare the robustness of the network system
under each of the three types of attacks as a function of
the interdependence strength d in the context of k-core
percolation. Figure 11 shows how the percolation thresh-
olds pc(k) under RA, LA and TA (with α = 1), change
with d where k = (3, 4) and γ = 2.3 for two SF networks.
Here in Fig. 11, as d increases from 0 to 1, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k)
and pTAc (k) increase accordingly, which means that the
more interdependent networks A ad B are on each other,
the less resilient they will be against attacks. Note that
the d = 0 case corresponds to the scenario shown in Fig. 6
at k = 3. For each d value, pLAc (k) ≈ pTAc (k) > pRAc (k),
which indicates that in the context of k-core percolation,
LA and TA (with α = 1) exert approximately the same
level of damage to the structure of a SF network whereas
RA produces less severe damage to a SF network. Similar
results are reported in the context of ordinary percolation
on SF networks [29, 32].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied and compared the robustness of both
single and interdependent networks under three types of
attacks in the context of k-core percolation. We show
that interdependence between networks makes the sys-
tem more vulnerable than their single network counter-
parts. In addition, we map a network under LA and TA
into an equivalent network under RA, solve analytically
the k-core percolation problem, and show how the ini-
tial attack type affects the robustness of networks. In
general, TA exerts the most damage. In particular, LA
and RA cause equal damage to ER networks whereas in
ultrasmall networks like SF networks, LA causes much
more damage than RA does. These findings hold for
both single networks and interdependent networks.
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